Displaying items by tag: Codes of conduct

Event report Wendy Fenton, Coordinator , Humanitarian Practice Network welcomed the speakers and attendees and introduced the speakers and discussant.  Amany Abouzeid, Human Security Policy Coordinator, ActionAid and co-author of the report then discussed the ideas behind the research. The research for the report followed the first cluster evaluations of the humanitarian assistance delivered after the conflict. ActionAid felt that these cluster evaluations were too mechanical and raised questions about the effectiveness of the humanitarian response. ActionAid felt there was a need to ask questions about humanitarian principles; perceptions of humanitarian assistance; and the global humanitarian project as a whole…

As part of its role as a neutral forum for debate, the Humanitarian Practice Network convened a public meeting on 26 October 2010 to discuss some of the lessons arising from the response to the earthquake in Haiti in January this year. The three speakers were Sir John Holmes, Director of the Ditchley Foundation and former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator; Ross Mountain, Director General of DARA International and Director of Director of DFID’s Humanitarian Emergency Response Review; and Linda Poteat, Director for Disaster Response in the Humanitarian Policy and Practice Unit at InterAction. The…

On 29 October 2008, a vehicle loaded with explosives forced its way into the UN compound in Hargeisa, the capital of the breakaway republic of Somaliland. The detonation killed two employees of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Across town, further bombs targeted the presidential palace and Ethiopia’s diplomatic representation. Another two bombs exploded in the semi-autonomous Puntland region. The attacks occurred as leaders from Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia met in Nairobi to discuss the Somali issue. Islamist groups with links to Al-Qaeda are believed to have been responsible. The events made headlines around the world. Images of broken windows,…

In recent years, staff security management within humanitarian organisations has developed considerably. Only ten years ago, many NGOs did not have full-time security officers, written security policies and guidelines or training programmes focused on the prevention and management of staff security incidents. Today the majority do. As the field expands, it is appropriate to look at how humanitarian organisations communicate to field staff about security issues. What key messages do staff receive about security management? What issues are less commonly addressed? How do organisations communicate these messages? To what extent are security messages and advice similar or different across organisations?…

Local perceptions of US ‘hearts and minds’ activities in Kenya In the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US military strategy has increasingly focused on the provision of humanitarian and development assistance in order to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of local communities.[1] This strategy, however, is not limited to active conflicts. The US military is also trying to win hearts and minds in Muslim populations in the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Established in 2003 and based in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) provides humanitarian and development assistance in the region as part…

Understanding the political economy of armed conflicts can contribute greatly to enhancing the security of humanitarian operations. Since the mid-1990s, the body of literature on war economies has grown steadily. Following a political economy approach, scholars and practitioners started looking at how armed conflicts redistribute wealth and power within war-torn societies.[1] This article discusses how this approach can assist humanitarian organisations in improving the security of their staff and operations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, academics and policy-makers had difficulty grasping and dealing with the so-called ‘new wars’ afflicting weak and collapsed states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone…

 The safety and security of humanitarian aid workers is arguably in greater jeopardy today than at any time in the history of the humanitarian endeavour. The environment has changed and it takes more than a set of technical skills and a friendly manner to be a successful humanitarian worker. Staff are no longer immune from acts of violence, if indeed they ever truly were, and acceptance strategies, so often adopted, are not always effective in some contexts. Humanitarian workers are expected to negotiate their way through complex, insecure and unfamiliar situations in a foreign language and culture in an unstable…

Aid agencies have worked hard in recent years to professionalise security management, including the provision of training for staff at headquarters and in the field and the formalisation of the risk management process. This article is part of a larger European Interagency Security Forum (EISF) research project to support NGO security management by documenting the risk acceptance process. It argues that programme managers should adopt a broader understanding of risk in order to contribute to flexible, organisation-wide judgements of risk exposure. To recognise risks effectively and engage with strategic decision-making, managers must understand what is at risk,[1] not just for…

Repeated bombings and attacks in Afghanistan, carjackings in Sudan and persistent insecurity in Somalia and elsewhere demonstrate the challenges of providing security for humanitarian aid workers. The statistics point to higher numbers of targeted attacks against aid workers between 2006 and 2008, driven largely by insecurity in Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan.[1] This growing insecurity has prompted media articles and a persistent and increasingly prevalent discourse among humanitarian organisations that challenges the efficacy of ‘acceptance’ as a legitimate, effective approach to security management. For example, a conference in April 2010 discussed the ‘limits and possibilities’ and the ‘(perceived) end’ of the…

A decade ago, only a handful of agencies were aware of and seriously considering the challenges posed by operational insecurity. At the time, few international or national organisations had designated security positions or policies on how to manage the risks of violence against their staff and operations. The impact of high-profile attacks such as the 1996 assassination of six ICRC workers in Chechnya spurred a number of international aid organisations into action. A collaborative learning initiative on security issues resulted in the earliest interagency security training, as well as the first edition of the Good Practice Review on Operational Security…