Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters for negotiated access

Key themes: the characteristics of armed groups; the relationship between armed groups and civilians; negotiation with armed groups; the promotion of IHL and negotiation; humanitarian access; and models for humanitarian agencies to analyse armed groups.

The purpose of the meeting was to launch HPN Network Paper no. 51, ‘Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters for negotiated access’, by Max Glaser. Maurice Herson (Senior Projects Manager for ALNAP) chaired the meeting and began by welcoming the participants, and introducing the two speakers – Max Glaser and Michelle Mack (ICRC).

Click here to listen the presentations in audio format.

Presentation by Max Glaser

Click here to view Max Glaser's PowerPoint prentation

The HPN paper developed out of research completed at the KSG Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy (Harvard University). The origins of the project stemmed from questions about the nature of fragile and failed states, concerns about staff safety and security, problems related to the protection of civilians, and debates about human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL). These questions led to more specific initial research questions: How do agencies decide when to leave a context? How do agencies decide how to get into a context? How do agencies talk to armed actors? With whom do agencies talk? In turn this led to a set of more fundamental questions: What does ‘negotiation’ actually mean? What is negotiated in exchange for access? Is it bartering (of positions/services) or persuasion (marketing of IHL)?

There are two main issues related to these questions: i) Who are the armed groups (What are their aims? How are they organised and how are they configured?) and ii) Who are the civilians (Do they cooperate and collaborate with armed groups? Can they influence armed groups? How do civilians fit within the conflict?). In answer to these questions, it is important to note that the nature of armed groups and their relationships to civilians have changed. In classic (trinitarian) warfare the relationship between civilians and armed groups is clear – civilians are linked to the government that controls the army that engages in the conflict. The nature of warfare, however, is now non-trinitarian and characterised by a multitude of armed actors including, but not in anyway limited to, the government. Armed groups in non-trinitarian warfare can be identified by the degree of their command structure, their independence from state control (thus not paramilitaries or death squads), their engagement in violence for political purposes, and by having a degree of effective control over some territory and population.

In this situation, civilians have more complex and diverse relationships to armed groups. For non-governmental humanitarian actors (NGHAs) civilians are seen as victims of war and beneficiaries of aid, but for armed groups civilians have a variety of different functions (they are fighters, supporters, targets, labourers, and the enemy). Thus when agencies think about engagement or negotiation with armed groups they need to understand the specific context in which they are working and particularly the precise nature and structure of armed groups, and their relationship to civilians.

To enable agencies to do this Glaser adapted a model from Zahar’s socio-economic classification of armed groups. Glaser’s model defines armed groups as i) protective, with a high degree of dependence on and protection of civilians, ii) competitive, with varying influence over territory and civilians, and sensitivity to in-out group dynamics, iii) antagonistic, with extremely strong in-out group dynamics, and iv) sectarian, which is characterised by diffused in-group dynamics. Having analysed the nature of armed groups and their relationships with civilian populations, agencies need to do a cost/benefit analysis to calculate the ramifications of any engagement/negotiation with armed groups.

So what do agencies do next? How do you start negotiating to establish humanitarian access? At what level? How do you choose an interlocutor? Again it depends on context and understanding the armed group, as there are different challenges for establishing negotiated access depending on the nature of the armed group and their objectives and interests. If engaging with a highly centralised armed group, you would engage at a senior level. With loose armed groups you have to engage all of the time and at all levels. With armed groups that are ‘spoilers’, it is impossible to negotiate. If using civilian interlocutors, you need to know their relationships and connections and their history (what they did last year, five years ago, and even fifteen years ago).

As indicated above, there are situations in which it is impossible and unacceptable to engage with armed actors, including when:

• The armed group is in a weak and defensive position and unable to guarantee access conditions

• The conflict is characterised by highly competitive and abusive armed groups

• The armed group is extremely antagonistic – genocidal

• The conflict is sectarian and characterised by extreme and total spoiler armed groups

Related to this is the impact of the global war on terror – it has introduced new concepts, new actors, new tactics, new methods, and competing values and ideologies. Traditional terrorist organisations have become much more diffuse: there are now networks, franchises, and freelance operators who it is impossible to negotiate with. One consequence of this for NGHAs is that such new armed groups are less likely to be persuaded or encouraged into respecting IHL norms or access agreements. There is also an increased need for specialist knowledge and a doubling of the importance of understanding context. And finally Glaser argued that it means that NGHAs will have to accept a higher level of risk with causalities, kidnapping and assassination more likely.

Presentation by Michelle Mack

This presentation was based on work Mack has been doing for ICRC on the promotion of IHL.

Glaser’s criteria for defining armed groups – command structure, independence from state control, engagement in violence for political purposes, and a degree of effective control over some territory and population – is helpful for analysing armed groups, but not necessarily as a criterion for determining whether or not to engage with an armed group. What do we do with armed groups that do not fit the criteria? Do we walk away? For ICRC the question is can we afford to limit ourselves in promoting access to civilians and respect for IHL to some armed groups and not others. The criteria are helpful, but there are questions about their utility. Finally, Common Article III of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions does provide criteria for classifying armed groups and determining which ones are parties to armed conflict.

ICRC’s mandate centres on the promotion of IHL and provision of protection. IHL is the base from which ICRC works. In turning IHL principles into practice, we need to identify obstacles to its respect and create ways to overcome those obstacles. ICRC’s research analysed the promotion of IHL and recognised that at times such activities will have limited affect, but this does not mean that promotion of IHL should not be prioritised, particularly as the lack of respect for IHL means that armed groups are less likely to adhere to access/protection agreements. In discussing IHL with armed groups it is fundamental to understand their nature and identify their interests, and discuss IHL in relation to their interest and objectives.

The promotion of IHL for ICRC is not only about the protection of civilians, but also about ensuring the rights of combatants under the Geneva Conventions. A key lesson from ICRC’s work in promoting IHL and negotiating access to civilians is that engagement with armed groups must take place over the long-term and must be part of a strategic engagement. Again Glaser’s characterisation of armed groups is helpful, but negotiation must be initiated and tried. The dilemma was also pointed out that, until you have started to engage with an armed group, it may not be possible to answer some of the questions about what their nature is and therefore how you can most constructively engage with them.

Finally there is a range of legal tools and methods available to build the understanding and respect of armed groups for IHL: i) codes of conduct can directly refer to IHL, ii) armed groups can make expressed declarations to respect IHL, iii) special agreements can be reached, and iv) the importance of structure and discipline of armed groups can be stressed.

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Discussion

Click here to listen the discussion in audio format.

The discussion began by focusing on how operating agencies engage with armed actors: whether they should do it individually or as a sector; whether a third party is useful and how; what the best approach is for different contexts; and whether they have enough information about armed groups and whether such information is shared.

Glaser responded by arguing that there is insufficient research, particularly at the operational level, although the best approach is really applied, practical learning. Darfur was cited as an example where UNOCHA negotiated access with the SLA. In Sierra Leone, the UN/ICRC negotiated an embargo on working in rebel areas, which some agencies however did not accept, but the rest of the community adhered to. Collective approaches can work. Context and organisational capacity should dictate whether these are more useful or whether to act independently. In Darfur MSF negotiated their own access separate to UNOCHA’s agreement, but they are big and therefore have a stronger capacity to negotiate access individually. The choice of interlocutor is important. It does not matter at what level, whether involving a UN Ambassador or village elders, and once an interlocutor has been involved, the agency is stuck with them.

Mack commented on the issue of negotiating agency space or humanitarian space, and argued that if getting armed groups to respect IHL means first negotiating agency space then this needs to happen.

Others commented that developing sufficient local knowledge is difficult, particularly when staff are only deployed for a short time. One barrier to applying learning can be the limited knowledge that operational staff have of local languages. Analysing and understanding the interests of armed groups is very time consuming, and it was suggested that agencies have a dedicated staff member consistently responsible for liaising with armed groups. Glaser responded that this is the reason why the paper provides agencies with a tool kit that they can adapt to different contexts. Staff in strategic positions need to be capable of analysing armed groups and determining the risk and benefits of negotiation.

The discussion then moved on to the inherent tensions in negotiating with armed groups, the power dynamics that agencies enter into when negotiating with armed groups, the conundrum of promoting IHL to protect civilians when armed actors target civilians, rather than using more political arguments, and when the principles of IHL are seen as Western rather than universal. A participant also reminded the meeting that when we talk about ‘new situations’, we need to remember that States violated IHL throughout the 20th century. What has changed is the increased number of NGHAs and we need to recognise how we affect the environment/context within which we work.

Acknowledging that aid creates waves in the pond, the debated focused on actually engaging with armed groups. For meaningful dialogue to be established, one participant stressed that you have to have trust and respect with those you are negotiating. Another participant highlighted that respect for IHL cannot be assumed and that agencies need to understand and appeal to the armed group’s local and international image, as well their relationship to the civilian population. The point was also made that in many situations armed groups have long experience of NGHAs, and they see us as political and not neutral. Many armed groups have humanitarian branches that are interested in developing grass routes legitimacy through the provision of social services. Thus when engaging with armed groups we need to engage with their values, objectives, and different activities. Respect for IHL is one aspect of negotiating with armed groups, but not the only one.

The debate finished by focusing back on the issue of what NGHAs should do in relation to groups that do not fit the criteria, and concerns that there is now a new situation and that NGHAs should put limits on their willingness to negotiate. Glaser and others argued that in some situations NGHAs should not negotiate with armed groups and that military power is required. Mack added that there are other possible means for dealing with such armed groups – engaging third parties or neutral states to negotiation and try and influence the armed group. Mack again stressed the importance of long term and strategic engagement, as nothing is guaranteed to work, and you have to learn about the context and try different approaches.